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ABSTRACT
ECONOMICS OF FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION DRUGS APPROVED IN THE UNITED
STATES
SEPTEMBER 2015
JING HAO, M.D. SHANXI MEDICAL UNIVERSITY
M.S., SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
M.P.H., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rosa Rodriguez-Mongio

Patent is the most important form of intellectual property protection for new drugs. Patent
extension and market exclusivity currently serve as major regulatory incentives to promote new
drugs. Combination drug, or fixed-dose combination (FDC) are formulations that contain two or
more active ingredients in a single pill. FDCs, especially combinations of singe drugs that are
already in the market, are common strategy for brand-name drug companies to extent the patent
and exclusivity life. The substitution of single drug products that soon have generic alternatives
with newer, brand-name combinations lead to potential increases in pharmaceutical expenditures
and raises concerns on economic burden. The study found that the effective patent life increased
overtime during the past three decades; however the effective patent life length was not
significantly associated with an increase in the number of approved new molecular entities
(NMEs), which often represent innovative new drugs. Other incentives, besides the patent life,
need to be considered as effective incentives to stimulate pharmaceutical innovations. The
vii

findings support hypothesis that the number of FDC approvals increased overtime from 1980s to
2012, while the approval number of the NME and new therapeutic Biologics License
Applications decreased during last decade. The findings also support hypothesis that the
pharmaceutical company market FDC drugs shortly before the generic versions of the single
ingredients enter the market extending the patent and marketing exclusivity life of drugs
included in the combination. In regard to the economic concern of the FDC, the study found that
the FDC average wholesale price (AWP) unit price increased significantly over time 1980-2012
and that pharmaceutical companies set FDC AWP, at the same level of the costliest single active
ingredient in the combination as pricing strategy to shift demand from single active ingredients
facing generic competition toward new FDC drugs. The price difference between FDC and
single ingredient drugs varied by therapeutic class, the year the FDC entered into the US market
and the number of single drugs in the combination that have generic drugs at FDC market entry.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iv
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. vii
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... xii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER
1: ARE PATENTS AND MARKET EXCLUSIVITIES AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO
STRENGTHEN PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION? ............................................................ 5
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 6
Data and Methods ........................................................................................................................ 8
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 10
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 12
Limitations................................................................................................................................. 14
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 15
References ...................................................................................................................................16
2: FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION DRUG APPROVALS, PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITIES
COMPARED TO SINGLE ACTIVE INGREDIENT PHARMACEUTICAL ............................ 26
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 26
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 28
Data and Methods ...................................................................................................................... 30
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 32
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 34
Limitations................................................................................................................................. 36
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 36
References ................................................................................................................................. 38

ix

3: FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION AND SINGLE ACTIVE INGREDIENT DRUGS: A
COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS .......................................................................................... 46
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 46
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 47
Data and Methods ...................................................................................................................... 49
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 52
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 55
Limitations................................................................................................................................. 57
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 58
References ................................................................................................................................. 59

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 68
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................................70

x

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

1. Effective Patent Life of FDA Approved NMEs by Regulatory Period ...................................21
2. FDA approved NMEs and Minimum Effective Patent Life, Regulatory Measure..................22
3. FDA approved NMEs and Maximum Effective Patent Life and Regulatory Measure ...........24
4. FDA-Approved FDC drugs by Therapeutic Category, 1980-2012 .........................................41
5. Time Lag between Approval of Single Active Ingredient NME and FDC .............................42
6. Time Lag between FDC Drug Approval and Single Drug Generic Market Entry ..................43
7. Effective Patent Life: FDCs Compared to Single Active Ingredient Included
in Combination.........................................................................................................................44
8. FDC and single active ingredient drugs AWP unit price by therapeutic class ........................64
9. FDC and single active ingredient drugs AWP by selected characteristics of
the combination ........................................................................................................................65
10. Correlations between the percentage of FDC AWP over sum AWPs of single active
ingredients and FDC drug characteristics ................................................................................66
11. Percentage of FDC AWP over single active ingredient prices: AWP and FUL ......................67

xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1. Regulatory Changes and Effective Patent Life of FDA approved NMEs, 1980-2009 ............20
2. Classification of FDC at First Approval ..................................................................................45
3. Potential Patent and Exclusivity Protection of FDC ................................................................45

xii

INTRODUCTION
Innovative new drugs are important to advance population health care by presenting new
treatment options for patients. However, the number of innovative new drugs (estimated by
drugs approved by the FDA as New Molecular Entity, NME) has decreased in the 2000s,
compare to previous decades1. The economics behind the pharmaceutical industry’s new drug
research and development (R&D) are complex, including considerations of patent life, market
size, public funding, economics of scale of selected therapeutic classes, prevalence of disease,
and status of scientific development, and these considerations do not necessarily always address
the needs of patients2,3. For example, given the growing public health threat of antibiotic
resistance and calls for innovative new antibiotics, pharmaceutical companies are curtailing their
R&D on innovative new antibiotics because of economic disincentives, i.e., that the profit return
is low4,5.
A patent is the most important form of intellectual property protection for new drugs.
Under a patent, the brand-name drug pharmaceutical company can charge a high drug price and
earn above-normal profit. When a patent expires, generic drugs normally enter the market and
bring the medication price down. Earlier studies indicate that patent protection is important for

1

Kaitin KI, DiMasi JA. Pharmaceutical innovation in the 21st century: new drug approvals in the first
decade, 2000-2009. Clin Pharmacol Ther. 2011;89(2):183-8.
2
Boots I, Sukhai RN, Klein RH, Holl RA, Wit JM, Cohen AF, et al. Stimulation programs for pediatric
drug research--do children really benefit? Eur J Pediatr. 2007;166(8):849-55.
3 Love J. Pharmaceutical research and development and the patent system. Int J Health Serv.
2005;35(2):257-63.
4
Nelson R. Antibiotic development pipeline runs dry. New drugs to fight resistant organisms are not
being developed, experts say. Lancet. 2003;362(9397):1726-7.Sonderholm J. Wild-card patent extensions
as a means to incentivize research and development of antibiotics. J Law Med Ethics. 2009;37(2):240-6.
5
Sonderholm J. Wild-card patent extensions as a means to incentivize research and development of
antibiotics. J Law Med Ethics. 2009;37(2):240-6.
1

advancing pharmaceutical innovations, and the absence of patent protection would affect the
innovation efforts of pharmaceutical companies6.
Currently, both patent extension and market exclusivity serve as the focus of policy
proposals and regulatory incentives to promote R&D by pharmaceutical companies7. For
example, the Waxman-Hatch Act (WHA) enacted in 1984 allows sponsors of FDA-approved
new drug applications (NDA) to recover the time that the FDA spent on the pharmaceutical
application review and half of the patent time the sponsor dedicated to clinical trials and
administrative activities required for FDA approval8.
Pharmaceutical companies use a variety of strategies, other than developing innovative
new drugs, to extend patent and market exclusivity life of their products 9 . A fixed-dose
combination (FDC) drug, which is the formulation of two or more active ingredients in a single
tablet, is one example. A drug introduced for the first time in the US market as an FDC may
contain only NMEs or a mix of NMEs and already-marketed products (i.e., NME & New
Combination), or only already marketed products (i.e., New Combination). The use of
combinations of products that are already marketed in the US has been a common strategy for
brand-name drug companies to extend the patent and exclusivity life of individual drugs,

6

Cohen W, Nelson RR, Walsh JP. Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not). National Bureau of Economic Research. 2000.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf. Accessed March14th 2015.
7
Kesselheim AS. Using market-exclusivity incentives to promote pharmaceutical innovation. The New
England journal of medicine. 2010;363(19):1855-62.
8

Grabowski H, Vernon J. Longer patents for increased generic competition in the US. The
Waxman-Hatch Act after one decade. PharmacoEconomics. 1996;10 Suppl 2:110-23.
9

Bhat VN. Patent term extension strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceuticals Policy and
Law 2005;6:109-22.
2

especially since implementation of the WHA, which lowered the barrier for generic entry10,11.
Importantly, over the last decade, prescribing patterns led to an increased utilization of FDC
drugs, which has raised concerns about their economic burden12.
Existing literature examines the association of a specific regulatory change with effective
patent life and/or drug innovation. However, to the authors’ knowledge, there is no evidence on
whether an increase in effective patent life protection is effective in bringing more innovative
new drugs to the market. Further, no empirical analysis has been conducted to assess the
approval and extension of patent and exclusivity life of FDCs. Existing studies assessing price
differences of FDCs and single ingredient drugs included in the combination focus on specific
FDCs of a few therapeutic classes, such as antihypertensive and respiratory medications13,14.
However, no published study has assessed the pricing structure of all FDA-approved FDC drugs
at the time of their first launch into the US market compared to all single ingredient drugs
included in the combination, to estimate overall price differences between FDCs and single
ingredient drugs, and by therapeutic class. A full literature review is presented within each
chapter.

10

Bhat VN. Patent term extension strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceuticals Policy and
Law 2005;6:109-22.
11

Hong SH, Shepherd MD, Scoones D, Wan TT. Product-line extensions and pricing strategies
of brand-name drugs facing patent expiration. Journal of managed care pharmacy. JMCP.
2005;11(9):746-54.
12

Hong SH, Wang J, Tang J. Dynamic view on affordability of fixed-dose combination antihypertensive
drug therapy. Am J Hypertens. 2013;26(7):879-87.
13
Friedman HS, Eid NS, Crespi S, Wilcox TK, Reardon G. Retrospective claims study of fluticasone
propionate/salmeterol fixed-dose combination use as initial asthma controller therapy in children despite
guideline recommendations. Clin Ther. 2009;31(5):1056-63.
14
Brixner DI, Lenhart G, Young DC, Samuelson WM. The effect of fixed combination of fluticasone and
salmeterol on asthma drug utilization, asthma drug cost, and episodes of asthma exacerbations. Curr Med
Res Opin. 2007;23(11):2887-95.
3

Thus, the goal of this dissertation, containing three manuscripts/chapters, is to investigate
the economics of FDC drugs. Specifically, in chapter I, we explore whether a longer effective
patent life is associated with more NME approvals and whether current regulatory changes are
associated with an increase in NME approvals. Chapter II aims to provide empirical evidence on
the approval trend of FDC drugs from 1980 to 2012, to assess the market-entry timing of the
FDCs, and to evaluate whether FDCs represent an effective patent life extension, compared to
the single active ingredients included in the combination. In chapter III, we compare the Average
Wholesale Price (AWP, i.e., listed drug price for pharmaceutical products sold by wholesalers to
retail pharmacies and nonretail providers and commonly used as a drug price benchmark)
difference between all FDCs of new drugs approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2012 and
single active ingredients included in the combination, and investigate the factors that are
associated with the price difference of FDC drugs and single active ingredients included in the
combination.

4

CHAPTER 1
ARE PATENTS AND MARKET EXCLUSIVITIES AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO
STRENGTHEN PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION?

Abstract
Patents and market exclusivities serve as regulatory incentives to promote pharmaceutical
innovation. This study assessed associations between major US regulatory changes enacted in
the last three decades, and the effective patent life and FDA approved New Molecular Entities
(NMEs) from 1980-2009. The Waxman Hatch Act (WHA) was associated with a 3.64 years
increase in the maximum effective patent life (p=0.01). The Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA) was associated with a 1.1 year increase in the minimum effective patent life (p=0.03).
The number of approved NMEs increased 45.7% (p=0.02) and 37.1% (p=0.04) 6 and 7 years,
respectively, after the WHA enactment. Likewise, the number of approved NMEs increased
42.4% (p=0.007), 65.8% (p<0.0001) and 51.3% (p=0.0008) 2, 3 and 4 years, respectively after
PDUFA enactment, and 76.1% (p=0.0006) after the enactment of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act. Conversely, the number of FDA approved NMEs decreased 43.5% (p<0.0001),
30.0% (p=0.01) and 30.4% (p =0.02) 1, 2 and 4 years, respectively after the enactment of the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act. The effective patent life length was not
associated with an increase in the number of approved NMEs. Other incentives, besides the
patent life, need to be considered to stimulate pharmaceutical innovation.

Keywords: Effective Patent Life, New Molecular Entities, Drug Regulation, Drug Approvals,
Food and Drug Administration, Patents, Exclusivities
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Introduction
Intellectual property (IP) law promotes scientific progress and facilitates the transfer of
technology by requiring public disclosure of inventions [1]. However, intellectual property
regulation also limits competition and increases the cost of patented products[1]. A patent,
granted by the United States (US) Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), is “a right for a
limited period of time to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention” [2]. A
patent is the most important form of intellectual property regulation for new pharmaceuticals [3,
4].
In the U.S., the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), enacted on June 8, 1995,
established a 20-year patent term (i.e., patent statutory term) from the filing date of a patent
application before the USPTO. Before this enactment, patentees received 17 years of patent life
from the date of patent issued by the USPTO. The FDA approval review process requires
extensive preclinical and clinical studies. Thus, the effective patent term (i.e., effective patent
life) left after the FDA approval is shorter than the regulatory patent term [4]. The USPTO grants
pharmaceutical patent extensions [5, 6] which partially restore the patent time spent in clinical
trials and patent application review time [7, 8]. The FDA grants market exclusivity rights to
sponsor companies upon approval of certain drug applications [9]. The FDA cannot approve a
generic application for a drug until the exclusivity expires.
Major regulatory changes occurred during the last 30 years in the US patent and drug
regulatory systems which include: the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act
(Waxman-Hatch Act -WHA) in 1984, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) in 1992, and
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) in 1997. The WHA allows
sponsors of FDA-approved new drug applications (NDA) to recover, with certain limits, the time
6

spent by the FDA on a pharmaceutical application review and half of the patent time the sponsor
dedicated to clinical trials and administrative activities required for FDA approval [10]. PDUFA
authorizes the FDA to collect fees from companies that produce certain human drug and
biological products [11, 12]. FDAMA provides an additional 6 months of market exclusivity
attached to any existing exclusivity or patent protection on a drug addressing pediatric studies [6,
7].
Both patent extensions and market exclusivity periods serve as regulatory incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to conduct research and development (R&D) [12-18]. Patent
extensions and market exclusivities are currently the focus of policy proposals to promote
innovation [6]. Therefore, it is important to examine the effectiveness of these regulations on
enhancing patent life and promoting approvals of new molecular entities (NMEs).
Prior research has examined the association between specific regulatory changes, drug
approvals and the effective patent life of pharmaceuticals [4, 8, 10, 12, 18]. The increase in the
average effective patent life resulting from the WHA extension was estimated around 2 years
[10]. In addition, although PDUFA reduced the FDA review time by more than 1 year [12], the
impact on increasing pharmaceutical spending on R&D remains unknown [6]. Almost half of all
patents filled before the USPTO by US applicants after URAA enhancement through 2007
benefited from the use of the 20-year patent statutory term [4]. FDAMA enactment resulted in an
increase in the drug studies conducted in the pediatric population; nevertheless, FDAMA did not
lead to an increase in the approval of pharmaceuticals indicated for children [19].
No study has examined the association between the length of the effective patent life and
the number of NMEs approved by the FDA. Thus, there is need to empirically assess the
effectiveness of the changes in regulation affecting drug patents and exclusivities of FDA

7

approved NMEs. The specific aims of this study are 1) to assess the association between main
pharmaceutical regulatory changes enacted in the US in the last three decades and the effective
patent life of NMEs approved by the FDA, 2) to determine if the length of the effective patent
life is associated with the number of FDA approvals of NMEs, and 3) to evaluate whether patent
and drug regulatory changes are associated with changes in the number of approvals of NMEs.
Data and Methods
Data were collected from electronic versions of the FDA’s “Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations’’ (Orange Book, OB) from 1980 to 2009 and from the
FDA's website. Patent information was abstracted from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) website. Data were updated through December 31, 2009. This study included all
NMEs approved in the U.S. between 1980 and 2009. The following information was extracted:
drug name, Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ACT) code, therapeutic class, NDA approval
date, patent expiration date, market exclusivity and generic competition data, and product
marketing status.
This study followed the conceptual model used in prior research to calculate the effective
patent life (i.e., time period from NME NDA approval to market exclusivity and patent
expiration) [20]. The study included FDA designated NMEs that were listed as the first NDA
approved by the FDA for the NME. NMEs were excluded from the analysis if they were never
marketed after FDA approval, discontinued or withdrawn from the market, or found not to have
at least one patent listed in the OB at some point during the period of analysis. NMEs were
categorized into an anatomical main group following the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
(ATC) classification system maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre
for Drug Statistics Methodology.
8

The unit of analysis was the first NDA and the first NDA Product Number for each NME
approved by the FDA during the study period. The FDA review time was estimated as the
difference between the NDA approval date and the NDA received day. The effective patent and
market exclusivity life includes the period from the NDA approval to market exclusivity and
patent expiration. Patents with the minimum and the maximum effective patent life were used to
estimate the minimum (first patent) and maximum (last patent) effective patent and market
exclusivity life when several patents were listed in the OB for a NME.
Summary descriptive statistics were computed for variables included in the analysis.
Wilcoxon-Sum Rank tests were computed to assess associations between the
minimum/maximum effective patent life and regulatory changes enacted during the study period.
The study period was divided into five regulatory periods (1) 1980- WHA(1984); (2)
WHA(1984) -PDUFA(1992); (3) PDUFA(1992) – URAA(1995); (4) URAA(1995)–
FDAMA(1997); (5) FDAMA(1997) - 2009 to assess the association between the patent and
exclusivity life and each regulatory measure compared to previous regulatory policy measure.
Poisson regression models were performed to assess the association between the number of
FDA approved NMEs and the minimum/maximum effective patent life controlling for drug
therapeutic class and the five regulatory changes included in the analysis. Poisson regression
models also controlled for a 1-10 year time delay in the effect of regulatory changes and
effective patent life length changes on the pharmaceutical company R&D stage to the USPTO
filing and FDA approval. All analyses were performed using SAS 9.4 statistical software for
Windows (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC, USA). Statistical significance was set at 0.05.
Poisson Regression Models:

9

Where = Total number of NME NDA approvals for each therapeutic category by year
= Minimum effective patent life for each therapeutic category by year
= Maximum effective patent life for each therapeutic category by year
= Therapeutic class
= WHA
= PDUFA
= URAA
= FDAMA
denotes a time delay factor, j=1, 2, 3,…..10 (years) and
β3=0 if

<1984, β3=1 if

>=1984

β4=0 if

<1992, β4=1 if

>=1992

β5=0 if

<1995, β5=1 if

>=1995

β6=0 if

<1997, β6=1 if

>=1997

Results
In the study period, the FDA approved 739 NMEs; the number of NMEs approved
increased from the 1980s (n=217) to the 1990s (n=311) and decreased in the period 2000-2009
(n=211). The patent life analysis included 581 NDA NMEs; and excluded 158 NDA NMEs that
did not have patent life information listed in the OB. In the study period, the average minimum
effective patent life was 10.25±3.94 years (median=10.27 years; IQR 6.97) and the average
maximum effective patent life was 13.56±5.72 years (median=14.00 years; IQR 7.62).
The WHA was significantly associated with a 3.64 years increase in the maximum effective
patent life. The median of the maximum effective patent life increased from 9.00 years (IQR
9.00) before the enactment of the WHA to 12.64 years (IQR 7.50) after the enactment of WHA
and before PDUFA (p=0.011) (Table 1). PDUFA was significantly associated with an increase in
the minimum effective patent life. The median of the minimum effective patent life was 9.63
10

(IQR 7.59) years after the enactment of the WHA and before the enactment of PDUFA; the
median of the minimum effective patent life increased to 10.73 (IQR 7.36) years after PDUFA
implementation and before the enactment of URAA (p=0.0283). However, the minimum
effective patent life decreased significantly after enactment of FDAMA, compared to the period
prior to FDAMA and after the enactment of URAA (median 10.44 years (IQR6.37) and 12.36
years (IQR 6.54), respectively (p=0.014)(Table 1, Figure1).
The association between the FDA approved NMEs and the minimum and maximum
effective patent life controlling for the therapeutic class and regulatory measure was not
statistically significant with the exception of a 2.5% decrease in number of approvals when
modeling a one year time delay in the effect of changes in the maximum patent life length
(p=0.0087) (Table 2, Table 3).
There is a statistically significant association between the approvals of NMEs by the FDA
and the specific regulatory measures enacted during the study period. Parameter estimates
revealed that the WHA was significantly associated with an increase in the FDA approved NMEs
6-7 years after its enactment. The number of FDA approved NMEs 6 years after the enactment of
WHA increased 46.09% (p=0.0154) and 45.71% (p=0.0183) in models controlling for the
minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively and the therapeutic class. Likewise,
the number of FDA approved NMEs 7 years after the implementation of the WHA increased
38.32% (p=0.0305) and 37.07% (p=0.0391) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life,
respectively(Table 2, Table 3).
PDUFA was significantly associated with an increase in the FDA approved NMEs
immediately following its enactment. The number of FDA approved NMEs 2 years after the
enactment of PDUFA increased 41.31% (p=0.0089) and 42.43% (p=0.0070) for the minimum
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and maximum effective patent life, respectively. The number of FDA approved NMEs peaked 3
years after the implementation of the PDUFA increasing 64.70% (p<0.0001) and 65.81%
(p<.0001) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively. The number of
FDA-approved NMEs 4 years after the implementation of the PDUFA increased 49.32%
(p=0.0014) and 51.32% (p=0.0008) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life,
respectively. In addition, PDUFA was associated with a significant decrease in the approvals of
NMEs 8 to 10 years after its enhancement; FDA-approved NMEs decreased 32.82% (p=0.0102)
and 30.69% (p=0.0169) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively 10
years after its enactment (Table 2, Table 3).
Likewise, URAA was significantly associated with an increase in the FDA approved NMEs.
One year after the implementation of URAA, the approvals of NMEs went up 72.24% (p=0.001)
and 76.10% (p=0.0006) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively.
Conversely, FDAMA was significantly associated with a decrease in the FDA approved NMEs.
One year after the enactment of FDAMA, the approval of NMEs was 44.12% (p<0.0001) and
43.47% (p<0.0001) lower for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively than
the prior year (Table 2, Table 3).
Discussion
Major regulatory changes in the U.S. patent system and drug regulatory system occurred in
the past three decades. One of the purposes of the patent system is to stimulate research and
development in the US. This study assessed to which extent regulatory changes implemented in
the US in the last 30 years are associated with changes in the number of FDA approved NMEs
and the effective patent life of pharmaceuticals.
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Study results corroborate prior research regarding secular trends in the FDA approval of
NMEs [21, 22]. Study findings reveal that there is a statistically significant positive association
between the WHA and PDUFA enactment and the length of the effective patent life. These
findings are consistent with prior research [4, 8, 10, 12, 18].
The assumption that stronger patent protection will stimulate innovation is contentious [5].
This study evidences that the association between the length of the effective patent life and the
approvals of NMEs is not statistically significant. Thus, other factors such as market size, public
funding and status of scientific development may explain the number of FDA approved NMEs
[23-26].
Study findings also evidence a statistically significant increase in the number of FDA
approved NMEs six to seven years after the enhancement of the WHA. The WHA substantially
increased the patent and exclusivity protection periods and it was enacted with the specific goal
of balancing the need for innovation and access to generic drugs.
This study revealed a statistically significant increase in the number of FDA approved
NMEs two to four years after the enhancement of PDUFA. PDUFA allowed the FDA to collect
fees from companies that sponsor new drug applications for certain human drug and biological
products, using those fees to hire more drug reviewers and shorten the time for pharmaceuticals
to reach the market [12]. The number of full-time equivalent FDA staff devoted to the drug
application review process nearly doubled from 1,277 in 1992 to 2,503 in 2004 [27]. Before the
enactment of PDUFA, the average FDA drug application review time in the period 1990-1992
was 31.0 months; after PDUFA 1993-1996 the FDA review time decreased to 14.5 months[12]
in spite of the backlog of NDAs awaiting FDA review in 1992 [28]. Thus, the association
between the enactment of PDUFA and the increase in the approvals of NMEs may be
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confounded by the fact that PDUFA created an incentive for the FDA to approve more
pharmaceuticals in exchange for resources from the pharmaceutical companies.
In addition, while URAA contain general incentives to promote research and development,
the observed increase in the approvals of NMEs one year after the enactment of URAA in 1995
may reflect a PDUFA spillover effect. The positive association between PDUFA enactment and
the FDA approved NMEs does not remain in the mid- or long-term.
There was a declining pace in the pharmaceutical innovation in the 2000s [29, 30]. Study
findings confirm the decrease in the number of NMEs approved after the enactment of FDAMA
and through the 2000s compared to the number of approvals in the 80s and 90s. In fact, in the
2000s, new indications, new formulations, and new combinations of previously marketed
products accounted for a large proportion (48.8% in 2006 alone) of the approvals[31]. This
decreased in the number of NMEs approved by the FDA support our findings that significantly
fewer NME approvals were observed eight to ten years after enactment of the PDUFA or one,
two and four years after the implementation of FDAMA.
In summary, study findings evidence that the extension of patents and market exclusivities
alone does not effectively translate into pharmaceutical innovation. Thus, further researcher is
needed to discern other factors behind the research and development of new drugs.
Limitations
Study findings must be considered with a few caveats in mind. This study focuses on the
patent and market exclusivity life of the first NDA of the NME. The study included first and last
patent listed in the OB and excluded other patents listed in the OB and patents not listed. The
average time for pharmaceutical preclinical development is estimated around 5 years and the
median time for clinical trial and regulatory review periods are estimated at 5.1 and 1.2 years,
14

respectively (Hondeghem et al. 2007; Keyhani et al. 2006).

While the regression models

estimate the effects of a regulatory change holding the impacts of other regulatory changes
constant, overlapping policy and regulatory effects may still exists.
Conclusion
PDUFA was associated with a statistically significant increase in the minimum effective
patent life; and the WHA was associated with a statistically significant increase in the maximum
effective patent life. In addition, the WHA, PDUFA and URAA were associated with a
statistically significant increase in the NMEs approved by the FDA. The effective patent life
length was not associated with a statistically significant increase in the number of approved
NMEs. Research is needed to further elucidate effective regulatory and policy measures to
incentivize pharmaceutical innovation.
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Figure 1. Regulatory Changes and Effective Patent Life of FDA approved NMEs, 19802009
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Table 1. Effective Patent Life of FDA Approved NMEs by Regulatory Period
Regulatory Measure

Patent and Pediatric Exclusivity Life in
Years Minimum Effective Patent Life

Patent and Pediatric Exclusivity Life in
Years Maximum Effective Patent Life

Mean(Std)

Median (IQR)

Mean(Std)

Median (IQR)

1. 1980-WHA(1984)

9.14 (4.68)

7.21 (6.82)

10.59 (6.09)

9.00 (9.00)

2. WHA(1984) –
PDUFA(1992)

9.80 (3.95)

9.63 (7.59)

12.73 (6.56)

12.64 (7.50)ƚ

3. PDUFA(1992) –
URAA(1995)

10.75 (4.15)

10.73 (7.36)*

13.48 (6.27)

14.00 (9.69)

4. URAA(1995) –
FDAMA(1997)

11.45 (4.21)

12.36 (6.54)

14.69 (5.38)

14.04 (6.92)

5. FDAMA(1997)2009

10.28 (3.59)

10.44 (6.37)ϝ

14.26(4.81)

14.06 (5.36)

FDAMA(1997)- 2004

10.63 (3.65)

11.16 (6.86)

14.69 (5.10)

15.06 (6.25)

2005-2009

9.45 (3.32)

9.09 (4.95)

13.20 (3.83)

13.61 (3.92)

1980-2009

10.25(3.94)

10.27(6.97)

13.56(5.72)

14.00 (7.62)

Note: *denotes statistically significant difference between the minimum effective patent life of policy periods 2.
WHA(1984) – PDUFA(1992) and 3. PDUFA(1992)-URAA(1995) (p-value 0.0283).
ϝ denotes statistically significant difference between the minimum effective patent life of policy periods 4.
URAA(1995) – FDAMA(1997) and 5. FDAMA(1997)-2009 (p-value 0.014).
Ƚdenotes statistically significant difference between the maximum effective patent life of policy periods 1. 1980WHA(1984) and 2. WHA(1984) – PDUFA(1992) (p-value 0.011).
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Table 2. FDA approved NMEs and Minimum Effective Patent Life, Regulatory Measure
Years after Enactment Estimate
IRR
95% CI
p-value
Bound
Minimum Effective Lower
patent Bound-Upper
life
1
-0.0143
0.9858
(-0.0425, 0.0140)
0.3227
2
0.0077
1.0077
(-0.0215, 0.0369)
0.6048
3
0.0008
1.0008
(-0.0289, 0.0305)
0.9588
4
0.0106
1.0107
(-0.0195, 0.0407)
0.4894
5
0.0079
1.0080
(-0.0227, 0.0385)
0.6109
6
0.0295
1.0300
(-0.0024, 0.0615)
0.0703
7
0.0015
1.0015
(-0.0306, 0.0336)
0.9262
8
0.0020
1.0020
(-0.0322, 0.0361)
0.9105
9
0.0097
1.0098
(-0.0244, 0.0439)
0.5761
10
0.0239
1.0242
(-0.0112, 0.0591)
0.1816
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

-0.0176
-0.1066
-0.0546
-0.0083
0.2116
0.3790
0.3244
0.1780
0.1410
0.2284

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.0446
0.3458
0.4990
0.4009
0.1173
-0.1255
-0.1370
-0.4543
-0.4433
-0.3980

WHA (1984)
0.9826
0.8989
0.9468
0.9918
1.2356
1.4609*
1.3832*
1.1948
1.1514
1.2566
PDUFA (1992)
1.0456
1.4131**
1.6470****
1.4932**
1.1245
0.8821
0.8720
0.6349**
0.6419**
0.6717*

(-0.3334, 0.2982)
(-0.4002, 0.1869)
(-0.3572, 0.2479)
(-0.2927, 0.2762)
(-0.0832, 0.5063)
(0.0725, 0.6856)
(0.0304, 0.6183)
(-0.1063, 0.4622)
(-0.1367, 0.4187)
(-0.0588, 0.5157)

0.9131
0.4765
0.7234
0.9546
0.1596
0.0154
0.0305
0.2197
0.3197
0.1191

(-0.2444, 0.3336)
(0.0868, 0.6047)
(0.2539, 0.7440)
(0.1554, 0.6465)
(-0.1373, 0.3720)
(-0.3924, 0.1414)
(-0.4141, 0.1401)
(-0.7687, -0.1399)
(-0.7452, -0.1414)
(-0.7018, -0.0941)

0.7622
0.0089
<.0001
0.0014
0.3665
0.3567
0.3326
0.0046
0.0040
0.0102
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Table 2. (Continued)

Years after Enactment

Estimate

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.5437
-0.0344
-0.2913
-0.2382
-0.2864
-0.3795
-0.3661
0.1121
0.0679
-0.0402

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

-0.5820
-0.3531
-0.2642
-0.3526
-0.1009
0.1136
0.1755
-0.0922
-0.0368
-0.0068

IRR
95% CI
Lower
bound
– Upper Bound
URAA (1995)
1.7224**
(0.2197, 0.8678)
0.9662
(-0.3568, 0.2879)
0.7473
(-0.6109, 0.0283)
0.7880
(-0.5636, 0.0872)
0.7510
(-0.6525, 0.0798)
0.6842
(-0.7821, 0.0230)
0.6935
(-0.7825, 0.0503)
1.1187
(-0.3037, 0.5280)
1.0703
(-0.3480, 0.4839)
0.9606
(-0.4767, 0.3962)
FDAMA (1997)
0.5588****
(-0.8351, -0.3289)
0.7025*
(-0.6376, -0.0687)
0.7678
(-0.5632, 0.0347)
0.7029*
(-0.6614, -0.0438)
0.9041
(-0.4449, 0.2432)
1.1203
(-0.2630, 0.4901)
1.1919
(-0.2145, 0.5656)
0.9119
(-0.4671, 0.2827)
0.9639
(-0.4336, 0.3600)
0.9932
(-0.4454, 0.4317)

Note: *p<0.05, **P<0.01, ***p<0.001, ****p<0.0001; IRR=incident rate ratio.
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P Value
0.0010
0.8342
0.0741
0.1514
0.1253
0.0646
0.0849
0.5972
0.7489
0.8567
<.0001
0.0150
0.0832
0.0252
0.5655
0.5545
0.3778
0.6298
0.8558
0.9756

Table 3. FDA approved NMEs and Maximum Effective Patent Life and Regulatory Measure
Years after Enactment Estimate
IRR
95% CI
p-value
Lowerlife
Bound-Upper Bound
Maximum Effective patent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

-0.0253
-0.0096
-0.0113
0.0040
-0.0065
0.0064
0.0031
0.0024
0.0012
0.0081

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.0408
-0.0689
-0.0281
-0.0144
0.2372
0.3765
0.3153
0.1715
0.1421
0.2149

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.0321
0.3536
0.5056
0.4142
0.1280
-0.0894
-0.1351
-0.4511
-0.4310
-0.3666

0.9750**
0.9904
0.9888
1.0041
0.9935
1.0065
1.0031
1.0024
1.0012
1.0081
WHA (1984)
1.0416
0.9334
0.9723
0.9858
1.2677
1.4571*
1.3707*
1.1871
1.1527
1.2398
PDUFA (1992)
1.0327
1.4243**
1.6581****
1.5132***
1.1365
0.9145
0.8737
0.6370**
0.6499**
0.6931*
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(-0.0442, -0.0064)
(-0.0284, 0.0092)
(-0.0306, 0.0080)
(-0.0144, 0.0225)
(-0.0252, 0.0122)
(-0.0122, 0.0251)
(-0.0156, 0.0217)
(-0.0169, 0.0216)
(-0.0177, 0.0202)
(-0.0116, 0.0277)

0.0087
0.3150
0.2523
0.6674
0.4961
0.4977
0.7479
0.8079
0.8986
0.4197

(-0.2780, 0.3596)
(-0.3676, 0.2297)
(-0.3337, 0.2775)
(-0.3039, 0.2752)
(-0.0632, 0.5377)
(0.0636, 0.6893)
(0.0158, 0.6149)
(-0.1186, 0.4617)
(-0.1423, 0.4265)
(-0.0788, 0.5086)

0.8020
0.6510
0.8569
0.9226
0.1218
0.0183
0.0391
0.2466
0.3275
0.1515

(-0.2552, 0.3194)
(0.0966, 0.6107)
(0.2630, 0.7483)
(0.1716, 0.6568)
(-0.1239, 0.3798)
(-0.3535, 0.1747)
(-0.4074, 0.1373)
(-0.7633, -0.1389)
(-0.7297, -0.1323)
(-0.6673, -0.0659)

0.8265
0.0070
<.0001
0.0008
0.3193
0.5070
0.3311
0.0046
0.0047
0.0169

Table 3. (Continued)
Year after Enactment

Estimate

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.5659
-0.0193
-0.2761
-0.2370
-0.2738
-0.3704
-0.3687
0.1093
0.0753
-0.0312

IRR
95% CI
Lower Bound – Upper Bound
URAA (1995)
1.7610***
(0.2412, 0.8905)
0.9808
(-0.3423, 0.3036)
0.7587
(-0.5962, 0.0439)
0.7890
(-0.5626, 0.0887)
0.7605
(-0.6405, 0.0930)
0.6904
(-0.7732, 0.0324)
0.6916
(-0.7854, 0.0480)
1.1155
(-0.3071, 0.5258)
1.0783
(-0.3400, 0.4906)
0.9693
(-0.4676, 0.4053)

FDAMA (1997)
1
-0.5705 0.5653****
(-0.8223, -0.3186)
2
-0.3550
0.7012*
(-0.6390, -0.0710)
3
-0.2637
0.7682
(-0.561, 0.0336)
4
-0.3630
0.6956*
(-0.6708, -0.0553)
5
-0.1058
0.8997
(-0.4493, 0.2378)
6
0.0971
1.1020
(-0.2795, 0.4737)
7
0.1715
1.1871
(-0.2189, 0.5619)
8
-0.0938
0.9105
(-0.4682, 0.2806)
9
-0.0442
0.9568
(-0.4403, 0.3520)
10
-0.0098
0.9902
(-0.4482, 0.4285)
Note: *p<0.05, **P<0.01, ***p<0.001, ****p<0.0001; IRR=incident rate ratio.
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P Value
0.0006
0.9065
0.0908
0.1539
0.1435
0.0715
0.0829
0.6069
0.7222
0.8887
<.0001
0.0143
0.0821
0.0208
0.5463
0.6132
0.3891
0.6234
0.8271
0.9649

CHAPTER 2
FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION DRUG APPROVALS, PATENTS AND
EXCLUSIVITIES COMPARED TO SINGLE ACTIVE INGREDIENT
PHARMACEUTICAL

Abstract
Background Fixed-dose combinations (FDC) contain two or more active ingredients. The
effective patent life of FDC compared to single active ingredient has not been assessed.
Objectives Trends in FDA approved FDC in the period 1980-2012 and time lag between
approval of FDC and single active ingredients in the combination were assessed, and the
effective patent life of FDC was compared with their single active ingredients.
Methods New molecular entities (NMEs), new therapeutic biologics license applications (BLAs)
and FDC data were collected from the FDA Orange Book and Drugs@FDA. Analysis included
FDC containing one or more NMEs or BLAs at first FDA approval (NMEs-FDC) and only
already marketed drugs (Non-NMEs-FDC). Descriptive, Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon Rank
Sum analyses were performed.
Results During the study period, the FDA approved 28 NMEs-FDC (3.5% of NMEs) and 117
non-NMEs-FDC. FDC approvals increased from 12 in the 1980s to 59 in the 2000s. Non-NMEsFDC entered the market at a median of 5.43 years (interquartile range 8.57) after first FDA
approval of single active ingredients in the combination. The Non-NMEs-FDC entered the
market at a median of 2.33 years (9.94) before single active ingredient generics approval. NonNME-FDC added a median of 9.70 (13.49) years to the patent and exclusivity life of the single
active ingredients in the combination.
26

Conclusion FDC approvals significantly increased over the last twenty years. Pharmaceutical
companies market FDC drugs shortly before the generic versions of the single ingredients enter
the market extending the patent and marketing exclusivity life of drugs included in the
combination.
Key words: Fixed-dose combination drugs, drug approvals, patent and exclusivity life, FDA
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Introduction
Patents are the most important form of intellectual property protection for new drugs [15]. In the US, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), enacted in June 8, 1995, established
a 20-year patent term (i.e. patent statutory term) from the filling date of a patent application
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Before URAA, patentees had
17 years of patent life upon the date when the patent was issued by the USPTO. Patent
extensions are granted by the USPTO to partly restore the time spent on clinical trials and FDA
review and market exclusivity are granted by the FDA upon approval of certain drug applications
[6-8]. Pharmaceutical products do not face generic competition during the effective patent life
period thus, pharmaceutical companies set up prices of new drugs to maximize profits [5,9].
Once the patents and exclusivities expire, generic drugs may enter the market driving down
pharmaceutical prices.
Fixed-dose combination drugs (FDCs) are formulations that contain two or more active
ingredients in a single dosage [10]. According to the FDA, “two or more drugs may be combined
in a single dose when each component makes a contribution to the claimed effects, and the
dosage of each component (i.e., amount, frequency, and duration) is such that the combination is
safe and effective for a significant patient population requiring such concurrent therapy” [11].
A new molecular entity (NME) and a new biologic license application (BLA) are drugs
containing active substances that have never before been approved for marketing in the US.
Some new drugs are first introduced as a FDC in the US market (i.e. NME-FDC). A NME-FDC
may contain only NMEs or a mix of NMEs and other already marketed drugs. A Non-NME-FDC
is a new combination that contains only already marketed drugs (Figure 2). The development and
marketing of FDCs have been a strategy for brand-name drug companies to extend the drug
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patent and exclusivity life of pharmaceuticals in the US, particularly after the enactment of the
Waxman-Hatch Act (WHA) in 1984 [12, 13].
If a FDC is novel, non-obvious, and useful, it can be patented and the exclusion of
competitors from the market can be enforced (Figure 3). In this case, the sponsor company is
able to add patent and exclusivity time to the combination of individual products included in the
FDC, for which patents and exclusivities may be expired or close to expire. The FDA provides
three years of market exclusivity to new NME-FDC when the application contains new clinical
investigations. If the new FDC is not patentable, the patent and exclusivity life of the FDC will
typically be equal to the three year market exclusivity or the longest patent and exclusivity life of
its individual components. FDC drugs allow patent holders to maintain the market share for
products included in the combination, to expand their patent and exclusivity protection, and to
shift the demand from single active ingredients to the FDC as patent expiration of single active
ingredients looms [13,14]. The substitution of less-expensive single drug products with newer,
high-priced, combinations leads to increases in pharmaceutical expenditures [15].
To the best of authors’ knowledge, no empirical analysis has been conducted to assess the
extent to which FDC drugs expand the effective patent and exclusivity life of pharmaceuticals.
Due to the growing number of FDC approved by the FDA and the difference in cost between
FDC and single active ingredients, there is a need for an in-depth analysis of trends in FDC drugs
approvals and the effective patent and exclusivity life of FDC compared to single active
ingredients included in the combination. Thus, the objectives of this study were: 1) to assess
trends in FDCs and single active ingredients approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2102; 2) to
estimate the time lag between the first approval of single active ingredients and the FDC drugs
containing those active ingredients; 3) to estimate the time lag between the first FDC approval
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and the approval of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for the active ingredients
included in the combination; and 4) to estimate the effective patent life of FDC drugs compared
to the single active ingredients included in the combination.
Data and Methods
Data were derived from the electronic versions of the FDA Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book, OB) and the Drug@FDA database from
1980 to 2012. The study included all FDA approved NMEs and BLAs during the study period.
Information collected for each FDA-approved pharmaceutical product included the NDA
number, product number, generic name, trade name, dosage form/route of administration,
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) code, National Drug Code (NDCs), market status (i.e.,
prescription, over-the-counter or discontinued), NDA approval date, patent expiration date, and
market exclusivity data. Therapeutic category information was extracted from the ATC
classification system maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for
Drug Statistics Methodology.
Using FDA data, a dataset with all NDAs and BLAs approved by the FDA during the
study period was created. All NMEs and BLAs approved during the study period, and all FDCs
containing at least one of those NMEs and BLAs were selected. The analysis was broken down
into two groups; FDCs containing at least one NME/BLA at first FDA approval (NME-FDC)
and FDCs containing single active ingredients approved for the first time during the study period
(non-NME-FDC). The units of analysis were the first NDA/BLA of all NMEs, BLAs, NMEFDCs, and non-NME-FDCs approved for the first time by the FDA during the study period.
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The effective patent and exclusivity life is the time period from the FDA approval of the
new drug application (NDA) to the expiration of all pharmaceutical patents and market
exclusivities [16]. The time lag from the last approval of the single active ingredients and the
first approval of FDCs containing those active ingredients was calculated. The time lag from the
first ANDA approval of the single active ingredients and the first approval of FDCs containing
those active ingredients was also calculated.
When a FDC had a generic alternative, the time difference in the patent and exclusivity
life of the FDC and the single active ingredients included in the combination was estimated as
the time between the dates of FDC first ANDA approval and the single active ingredients ANDA
approvals. When a FDC did not have a generic alternative in the market, the difference in the
patent and exclusivity life was estimated as the time between the FDC last patent and market
exclusivity expiration date and the single active ingredients ANDA approval dates. The analysis
was stratified by pharmaceutical sponsors that marketed both the single active ingredients and
the corresponding FDC drugs, and by sponsors that marketed FDC drugs but not the single active
ingredients.
A descriptive analysis of the variables included in the study was performed. Differences
among therapeutic categories were tested using Kruskal-Wallis test and two groups Wilcoxon
Rank Sum tests. Differences between non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredients sponsored
by the same company and those sponsored by different companies were tested by Wilcoxon
Rank Sum tests. Inferential analyses, which employ probability theory and test significances,
were performed on therapeutic classes that had 5 or more FDC drugs. Significance level was set
at 0.05. All analyses were performed using SAS software, version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary,
NC, USA).
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Results
FDA-approved FDC drugs
In the period 1980-2012, the FDA approved 901 new drugs, including 811 NMEs and 90
BLAs. NME-FDC drugs represented 3.5% of the FDA-approved NMEs (n=28). The FDA did
not approve any combination for BLAs. In the study period, 7 (25%) of the 28 NME-FDC drugs
were discontinued. The largest number of NME-FDC drugs were antiinfectives (n=7), genitourinary system and sex hormones (n=6), and dermatologicals (n=4). The majority (5 out of 7) of
the FDC antiinfectives was approved in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 4).
In addition, the FDA approved 117 non-NME-FDC drugs (i.e. 115 NMEs and 2 BLAs)
that had at least one single active ingredient approved by the FDA during the study period. The
non-NME-FDC drugs approved in the study period included 156 different single active
ingredients with an average of 2.1 active ingredients per combination. A total of 23 (20%) of the
117 non-NME-FDC drugs were discontinued from the market as of December 31, 2012. NonNME-FDC drugs approved by the FDA increased over time from an average of 1.2 approvals per
year (n=12) in the 1980s to 2.5 (n=25) in the 1990s and 5.9 (n=59) in the 2000s. During the
period 2010-2012, the FDA approved an average of 7.0 (n=21) non-NME-FDC drugs per year.
The percentage of NME/BLA and non-NME-FDC increased from 5.5% in 1980s to 25.0%
during the period 2010-2012. The ATC classes with the largest number of non-NME-FDC
approved by the FDA were cardiovascular diseases (n=41), alimentary tract and metabolism
(n=26), respiratory system (n=10), and antiinfectives (n=10).
Overall, 10.4% (n=12) of the 117 non-NME-FDC, were approved by the FDA using the
priority review procedure (i.e., a review process applied by the FDA to drugs considered
improvements over already marketed therapeutic alternatives). The percentage of priority review
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approvals was highest for non-NME-FDC of antiinfectives for systemic use (50.0% of total FDA
approvals).
Market Entry and Effective Patent Life
Non-NME-FDC entered the market at a median of 5.43 years (interquartile range, IQR
8.57 years) after the first approval of the single active ingredients included in the combination
(Table 5). This time lag significantly varied by therapeutic class (p=0.0146). Antiinfectives and
cardiovascular system non-NME-FDC entered the market significantly sooner (median 1.89
years, IQR 5.41) compared to the nervous system (7.23, IQR 14.32), respiratory system (9.34,
IQR 4.15) and sensory organs (10.73, IQR 4.86)) (p<0.05).
The difference in market entry between non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredients
sponsored by the same company and those sponsored by different companies was statistically
significant. When the non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredient were sponsored by the
same company, the FDC entered the market at a median of 4.50 years (IQR 6.19) after the first
approval of the single active ingredients included in combination; whereas, when the applicant of
the non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredient were different, the non-NME-FDC entered
the market at a median of 10.31 years (IQR 12.04) after the first approval of the single active
ingredients in the combination (p=0.0112) (Table 5).
Non-NME-FDC drugs entered the US market at a median of 2.33 years (IQR 9.94) before
the generic alternative of the single active ingredient included in the combination reached the
market; the time difference did not significantly varied by therapeutic class (p= 0.0965) (Table
6). When a non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredients were sponsored by the same
company, the non-NME-FDC entered the market at a median of 5.05 years (IQR 7.51) before the
first generic approval of the active ingredients; whereas, when the sponsor of the non-NME-FDC
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and the single active ingredients were different, the non-NME-FDC entered the market 1.85
years (IQR 7.17) after the generic single active ingredients reached the market (p<0.0001).
Non-NME-FDC drugs added a median of 9.70 years (IQR 13.49) of patent and market
exclusivity protection to the effective patent life of the single active ingredients included in the
combination; being the difference by therapeutic class not statistically significant (p=0.1535)
(Table 7). The difference in the effective patent life between non-NME-FDC and the single
active ingredients sponsored by the same company and those sponsored by different companies
was statistically significant. When the sponsor of the non-NME-FDC was the same as the single
ingredient drug, the non-NME-FDC added in median 7.73 years (IQR 10.29) to the patent and
market exclusivity life of the single active ingredient. Furthermore, when the sponsor of the nonNME-FDC and the single ingredient drug were different, the non-NME-FDC added a median of
11.48 years (IQR 13.48) of patent and market exclusivity protection (p=0.0048).
Discussion
This study analyzed trends in all FDA approved FDCs in the period 1980-2012 and
assessed the extent to which FDC drugs expand the effective patent life of previously marketed
single active ingredient drugs. Study findings reveal that approval of FDC increased
significantly over the last twenty years and varied by therapeutic class; the largest number of
FDC approvals were for the treatment of highly prevalent conditions (i.e. cardiovascular and
respiratory system drugs).
Antiinfective FDC drugs entered the market relatively soon after the approval of the
single active ingredient drug NMEs. This strategy may be related with the significantly longer
effective patent life of antiinfectives, compared to other therapeutic classes, and the high demand
of antiinfective drugs [17, 18] . FDC drugs for cardiovascular diseases also entered the market
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relatively soon after the approval of the single active ingredient drug NMEs, and represent a
significantly shorter increase in the effective patent life.
Study findings also evidence that pharmaceutical companies market FDC drugs shortly
before the generic version of the single active ingredient drug enters the US market thus,
extending the patent and marketing exclusivity protection of the single drugs included in the
combination. In addition, approximately 80% of non-NME-FDC drugs were sponsored by the
same applicant of at least one single ingredient drug included in the combination. Shifting the
demand to FDC drugs as patents and exclusivities of single active ingredients expire may impose
a financial burden on public and private health programs and patients [19-22].
The time lag between approval of the single active ingredient drug NMEs and the FDC
and the increase in the effective patent life of non-NME-FDC drugs differed significantly
between those non-NME-FDC sponsored by the same company and those sponsored by different
companies. When sponsored by different companies, FDC drugs cannot enter the market before
the expiration of the patents and exclusivities of the single active ingredients. Whereas, when
sponsored by the same company, the pharmaceutical company can market their FDC drugs prior
to generic entry, expanding the patent and market exclusivity protection of the active ingredients
included in the combination.
Pharmaceutical companies often advertise FDC drugs as pharmaceutical products that are
convenient to the patient [23, 24]. Research is needed to assess the cost-effectiveness of FDC
compared to single active ingredient pharmaceuticals.
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Limitations
Study results must be considered with a few caveats in mind. The study analyzed NMEs
and BLAs; other biologic products including blood, vaccines, allergenics, tissues, and cellular
and gene therapies were excluded from the analysis. The study includes the last patent listed in
the OB for the first product number of the first NDA of each NME and excludes successive
NDAs (e.g. line extensions). Study data used in the analysis are right censored. The effective
patent life of NMEs can increase due to new patents listed by the sponsor’s company, patent
extensions and pediatric exclusivity.
Conclusion
Approvals of FDC drugs significantly increased over the last twenty years and varied by
therapeutic class. The large majority of FDC includes at least one single active ingredient first
approved by the FDA in the period of 1980-2012. A small percentage of FDC was approved
using the FDA priority review procedure.
The time lag between first approval of the single active ingredients and FDC drug
approval significantly varied by therapeutic class and sponsor’s company of the pharmaceutical
product. Likewise, the time lag in the market entry between the FDC and single generic drugs
vary significantly depending on whether the sponsor of the FDC and the single active ingredients
included in the combination are the same or different. Pharmaceutical companies market FDC
drugs shortly before the generic alternative of the single active ingredient in the combination
reaches the market, thus effectively extending the patent and marketing exclusivity life of the
single drugs included in the combination. The difference in the effective patent and exclusivity
life between FDC and single ingredient drugs vary significantly depending on the therapeutic
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class and whether the sponsor of the FDC and the single active ingredients included in the
combination were the same or different.
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Table 4. FDA-Approved FDC drugs by Therapeutic Category, 1980-2012
NME-FDC
Alimentary tract and metabolism
Antiinfectives for systemic use
Antineoplastic and immunomodulating
Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents
Cardiovascular system
Dermatologicals
Genito urinary system and sex hormones
Musculo-skeletal system
Nervous system
Respiratory system
Systemic hormonal preparations
Various
Total NME-FDC
Single Active Ingredient BLAs and NMEs
Total NME-FDC and Single Active Ingredient BLAs and NMEs
Non-NME-FDC
Alimentary tract and metabolism
Antiinfectives for systemic use
Antineoplastic and immunomodulating
Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents
Cardiovascular system
Dermatologicals
Genito urinary system and sex hormones
Musculo-skeletal system
Nervous system
Respiratory system
Sensory organs
Various
Total Non-NME-FDC

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010-2012

Total

1
3
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
8
217
225

0
2
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
6
333
339

1
1
1
0
0
2
3
0
1
0
1
1
11
240
251

1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
3
83
86

3
7
1
1
0
4
6
0
1
2
1
2
28
873
901

2
2
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
12

2
2
1
0
13
1
0
1
0
2
3
0
25

14
5
2
1
15
4
1
2
5
5
3
2
59

8
1
1
0
6
0
2
0
0
2
1
0
21

26
10
4
1
41
5
3
3
5
10
7
2
117
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Table 5. Time Lag between Approval of Single Active Ingredient NME and FDC
Therapeutic Class

FDC and Previously Approved
Single Drug NME Same Applicant

FDC and Previously Approved
Single Drug NME Different
Applicant

No.
of
FDC

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

Alimentary tract and metabolism

15

5.18(3.02)

6.12 (4.81)

No.
of
FD
C
7

15.13(7.08)

Antiinfectives for systemic use

9

4.50(5.18)

1.91 (4.54)

1

0.22

15.56
(18.01)
0.22

Antineoplastic and Immunomodulating
Agents
Antiparasitic products, insecticides and
repellents
Cardiovascular system

4

10.12(11.95)

5.59 (14.83)

1

7.63

33

Dermatologicals

Total

No.
of
FD
C
22

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

8.34(6.55)

6.31 (8.18)

10

4.07(5.07)

1.89 (5.41) ƚ

0

4

10.12(11.95)

5.59 (14.83)

7.63

0

1

7.63

7.63

3.90(3.57)

2.68 (4.31)

8

7.75(5.68)

7.47 (9.35)

41

4.65(4.27)

3.48 (5.89) ƚ

1

12.52

12.52

1

27.34

27.34

2

19.93(10.48)

Genito urinary system and sex hormones

1

8.56

8.56

0

1

8.56

19.93
(14.82)
8.56

Musculo-skeletal system

1

9.52

9.52

2

12.35(4.16)

3

11.41(3.37)

9.52 (5.89)

Nervous system

4

9.53(7.66)

6.84 (8.95)

1

24.73

12.36
(5.89)
24.73

5

12.57(9.50)

7.23 (14.32)

Respiratory system

6

7.18(4.93)

6.11 (5.71)

3

10.47(1.71)

9.63 (3.09)

9

8.27(4.31)

9.34 (4.15) ƚ

Sensory organs

4

11.15(3.40)

11.39 (4.38)

2

6.82(4.93)

6.82 (6.98)

6

9.70(4.10)

10.73 (4.86)

Various

1

0.00

0.00

0

1

0.00

0.00

80

5.64(5.04)

4.50 (6.19)*

25

ƚ

10.31
105
7.06(6.25)
5.43 (8.57)
(12.04)
Notes: ƚ Statistically significant difference among therapeutic classes: Antiinfectives for systemic use compared to nervous system (p=0.0275), respiratory
system (p=0.0412), and sensory organs (p=0.0301), respectively. Cardiovascular system compared to nervous system (p=0.0274), respiratory system
(p=0.0209), and sensory organs (p=0.0183), respectively. Note that the statistical significance does not hold when Bonferroni Correction was applied.
* Statistically significant difference between FDC and single drug NME same and different applicant (p= 0.0112).
IQR=Interquartile Range.
Total

42

11.60(7.58)

ƚ

Table 6. Time Lag between FDC Drug Approval and Single Drug Generic Market Entry
Therapeutic Class

FDC and Previously Approved Single Drug
NME Same Applicant

FDC and Previously Approved
Single Drug NME Different
Applicant

Total

No.
of
FDC

Mean(Std)

Median (IQR)

No.
of
FDC

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

No.
of
FDC

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

Alimentary tract and
metabolism
Antiinfectives for systemic
use
Antineoplastic and
Immunomodulating Agents
Antiparasitic products,
insecticides and repellents
Cardiovascular system

11

(-5.08)(4.12)

(-5.99) (5.69)

9

6.43(3.89)

5.18 (5.47)

20

0.10(7.06)

(-0.20)(10.31)

6

(-7.24)(6.16)

(-6.07) (4.89)

0

6

(-7.24)(6.16)

(-6.07)(4.89)

2

2.91(16.20)

2.91 (22.90)

2

4

2.54(9.50)

(2.18)(13.47)

1

(-10.50)

(-10.50)

0

1

(-10.50)

(-10.50)

18

(-8.12)(5.34)

(-8.42)(7.69)

17

(-1.13)(5.53)

1.42(9.33)

35

(-4.72)(6.42)

(-5.12)(11.79)

Dermatologicals

1

(-1.48)

(-1.48)

1

12.27

12.27

2

5.40(9.73)

5.40(13.75)

Genito urinary system and
sex hormones
Musculo-skeletal system

1

(-0.52)

(-0.52)

0

1

(-0.52)

(-0.52)

2

(-1.82)(1.43)

(-1.82)(2.02)

1

2.49

2.49

3

(-0.39)(2.69)

(-0.81)(5.32)

Nervous system

4

(-0.30)(6.56)

0.78(9.34)

1

11.27

11.27

5

(-2.01)(7.68)

2.39(7.19)

Respiratory system

7

(-1.52)(5.61)

(-3.72)(6.41)

2

(-1.24)(1.54)

(-1.24)(2.18)

9

(-1.46)(4.89)

(-2.33)(3.90)

Sensory organs

2

0.96(4.91)

0.96(6.93)

3

(-2.33)(10.80)

(-6.33)(20.45)

5

(-1.02)(8.22)

(-2.51)(10.75)

Various

0

Total

55

(-2.27)(7.06)

(-2.33)(9.94)

2.17(2.85)

2.18(4.03)

0
(-4.83)(6.25)

(-5.05)(7.51) ***

36

0
1.66(6.46)

1.85(7.17)

Notes:
*** Statistically significant difference between FDC and single drug NME same and different applicant, p<0.0001.
IQR=Interquartile Range

43

91

Table 7. Effective Patent Life: FDCs Compared to Single Active Ingredient Included in Combination
FDC and Previously Approved
Single Drug NME Same applicant

FDC and Previously Approved
Single Drug NME Different
Applicant

Therapeutic Class

Alimentary tract and
metabolism
Antiinfectives for systemic
use
Antineoplastic and
immunomodulating agents
Antiparasitic products,
insecticides and repellents
Cardiovascular system
Dermatologicals
Genito urinary system and
sex hormones
Musculo-skeletal system
Nervous system
Respiratory system
Sensory organs
Total

Total

No. of
FDC

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

No. of
FDC

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

No. of
FDC

Mean(Std)

Median
(IQR)

9

8.70(4.80)

9.70(3.63) ƚ ƚ

9

17.84(8.05)

21.51(14.03)

18

13.27(7.97)

11.29(13.78)

4

5.77(2.37)

6.04(3.67)

0

4

5.77(2.37)

6.04(3.67)

0

0
1

0.00

0.00

0
1

0.00

0.00

0

10
1
1

2.34(3.29)
17.13
5.72

1.05(2.74) ƚ ƚ
17.13
5.72

15
1
0

10.05(6.31)
23.85

10.84(7.40)
23.85

25
2
1

6.97(6.49)
20.49(4.76)
5.72

6.98(9.99)
20.49(6.72)
5.72

2
4
7
2
41

13.80(4.03)
7.61(7.62)
9.22(8.96)
17.13(3.56)
7.42(6.54)

13.80(5.70)
6.86(12.38)
10.97(18.02)
17.13(5.04)
7.73(10.29)**

1
1
2
3
32

17.03
29.60
9.97(14.06)
9.17(8.41)
13.41(8.47)

17.03
29.60
9.97(19.89)
10.99(16.53)
11.48(13.48)

3
5
9
5
73

14.88(3.41)
12.01(11.84)
9.39(9.22)
12.36(7.59)
10.05(7.98)

16.65(6.08)
10.88(13.88)
10.97(18.02)
14.61(5.54)
9.70(13.49)

Notes:
ƚ ƚ Statistically significant difference between Cardiovascular System and Alimentary Tract and Metabolism (p=0.0053)
** Statistically significant difference between FDC and single drug NME same and different applicant (p=0.0048)
IQR=Interquartile Range
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Figure 2. Classification of FDC at First Approval
NME & New Combination (NME-FDC)


FDC of 2 or more NMEs



FDC of 1 or more NMEs and 1 or more already marketed products

New combination not containing a NME (Non-NME-FDC)


FDC of 2 or more already marketed single drug products

Figure 3. Potential Patent and Exclusivity Protection of FDC
Patents and exclusivities of single products


Patents of single products



Market exclusivity of single products

Patents and exclusivities of the FDC


Patents of the new combination



Market exclusivity of the new combination
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CHAPTER 3
FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION AND SINGLE ACTIVE INGREDIENT DRUGS: A
COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS

Abstract
Background: Fixed-dose combination (FDC) drugs are formulations of two or more active
ingredients.
Objectives: To assess the pricing structure and price difference of all FDA approved FDCs and
single drugs included the combination.
Methods: Data were collected from the FDA Orange Book and Drugs@FDA. Average
Wholesale Price (AWP) unit price data were derived from The Red Book.
Results: The FDA approved 117 FDC. The average AWP difference percentage between the
FDC and the sum of the single drugs in the FDC is 84.9%±26.2% and varied by therapeutic class
(p<0.01). The FDC AWP averaged 83.3%±23.4% of the single drug AWP sum when there are
no generics, and 95.1%±42.3% (p<0.01) when there are 2 generic single active ingredients in the
FDC.
Conclusions: The price difference between FDC and single active ingredients in the
combination is correlated with the therapeutic class, the year of FDC approval, and the number
of single ingredients in the combination that have generics.
Key Words: Fixed-dose combination drugs; Average Wholesale Price; Drug Approvals; Food
and Drug Administration.
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Introduction
Combination drugs, or fixed-dose combination (FDC) drugs, are formulations of two or
more active ingredients in a single tablet [1]. According to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), two or more drugs may be combined into a single dose when each
component makes a contribution to the claimed effects and the dosage of each component (i.e.,
amount, frequency, and duration) produces a safe and effective treatment for a significant patient
population requiring such concurrent therapy [2]. FDC drugs are used to treat a range of medical
conditions including asthma, diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases, and infectious diseases, such
as HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis [3, 4].
FDC drugs became a popular marketing strategy of the pharmaceutical industry to extend
the life cycle of pharmaceuticals, especially after implementation of the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act in 1984 (i.e., Waxman Hatch Act -WHA), which facilitates
faster entry of generic drugs into the market [5-8]. Pharmaceutical companies introduced FDC
drugs to expand their patent and exclusivity periods and to shift the demand to combination
drugs as patents and exclusivities of single active ingredients expire [8, 9]. The approval of FDC
drugs allows the pharmaceutical industry to maintain at least part of the sales of the single
ingredient products experiencing generic competition. The substitution of old less-expensive
prescription drugs with new costly pharmaceutical products accelerated the growth in
prescription drug spending [10]. Further, over the last decade, prescribing patterns led to an
increased utilization of FDC drugs [11-15]. The increasing utilization and cost of FDC drugs has
raised concerns about its economic burden and overall health benefits for the patient [12, 16].
Previous studies assessed differences in the cost of FDC drugs and single-active
ingredients included in the combination using a convenience sample of FDC. Studies focused on
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few therapeutic classes such as antihypertensive medications [14, 17-23] and respiratory drugs
[11, 24-27]. Rabbani and Alexander (2008) compared drug costs of 27 most commonly
prescribed FDC antihypertensive drugs and the cost of their generic single active ingredients
using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The total monthly prescription cost was
lower for 23 of the 27 FDC antihypertensive drugs examined [17]. Hong, Wang and Tang (2013)
assessed the cost of 26 antihypertensive FDC drugs also using MEPS data [14]. Authors found
that the FDC drug cost was similar to the non-generic single active ingredients but higher than
the generic version of single active ingredients [14]. Likewise, study results for respiratory
system drugs evidenced that on average, the total monthly prescription drug cost of FDC exceeds
the cost of the single active ingredients included in the combination [11, 24, 27].
In summary, previous studies were a retrospective analysis of commercial or public
insurance claims data based on reimbursement rates by patients and third party payers. Studies’
findings were mixed and inconclusive with regards to cost differences between FDC drugs and
single active ingredients. Some studies estimated that the FDC average annual prescription drug
cost per patient was higher than the cost of single active ingredients included in the combination
[11, 23-26], whereas, other studies found the opposite [18-21]. Ten out of 13 peer-reviewed
studies found through a literature review, were sponsored by the drug manufacturer.
This study builds on prior research to assess the pricing structure of all FDC drugs at the
time of their first launch into the US market, and compare the prices of the FDC and the single
active ingredient drugs included in the combination by type of approval and therapeutic class.
Thus, the specific objectives of the study were to assess the price difference between all FDC of
new drugs approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2012 and single active ingredients included
in the combination; and to analyze the association between the price difference of FDC drugs
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and single active ingredients included in the combination and the therapeutic class, the FDA
approval year of the FDC, and generic availability of single active ingredients included in the
combination.
Data and Methods
Data for all FDA approved new molecular entities (NMEs –i.e., a new drug containing an
active ingredient that has never before been approved for marketing in the US), new therapeutic
biologic license applications (BLAs –i.e., a new biologic license application approved by the
FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research), FDC drugs, and the single active ingredient
drugs included in the combinations were derived from electronic versions of the FDA Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book-OB), and Drugs@FDA.
Pharmaceutical prices data were extracted from Thomson Micromedex’s Red Book online. The
Red Book is a reference source for pharmacists for prescription and over-the-counter drug prices
[28]. It includes pricing history and comprehensive drug information for all FDA approved and
marketed brand and generic prescription drugs, and over-the-counter drugs. The Red Book
provides current and historical information of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP -i.e., listed
drug price for pharmaceutical products sold by wholesalers to retail pharmacies and nonretail
providers) [28, 29]. The Red Book also contains information about the Federal Upper Limit
(FUL –i.e., a Federal program that limits Medicaid reimbursement rate for certain multiple
source drugs when generics are available in the US market). Last, therapeutic category data are
derived from the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system maintained by
the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology. Data sets
were combined by matching the drug National Drug Code (NDC), drug product trade name, and
active ingredient.
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The study included all FDC drugs approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2012 that had
at least one single drug approved as a NME or BLA during the study period. The study also
included all single active ingredient pharmaceutical products included in the FDC. This study
followed the FDA classification of FDC drugs at the time of FDA first approval which includes
NME & new combination (i.e., new combination includes a mix of already marketed products
and at least one FDA approved NME), and new combination (i.e., all active ingredients in the
combination are already marketed products).
Data collection for each FDC drug and single active ingredients included the following
information: drug product trade name, active ingredient, dosage/strength, form/route of
administration, package size, unit dosage, application number, product number, drug formulation
(i.e., FDC drugs, single active ingredient drugs), approval date, NDC, drug applicant, AWP unit
price and effective date, and FUL unit price and effective date. AWP data were collected for all
first New Drug Application (NDA) of NMEs & new combinations, and new combinations at the
time of first drug market entry. The unit of analysis combined the active ingredient(s), route,
form, and strength for each FDC drug or single active ingredient.
The study included the first NDA of all FDA approved NMEs & new combinations, first
NDA of new combinations containing at least one drug product previously approved by the FDA
as a NME or BLA in the study period, and all single active ingredient drugs included in the
combination. The analysis excluded repackages and unit-dose products. When several package
sizes were available for a FDC or single active ingredient at the first entry date, the package size
closer to 100 units was used for the analysis. If several generic products were available for a
single active ingredient, the estimated average price for the single active ingredient generic drug
with package size closest to the units contained in the FDC was used for the analysis. When there
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were no generics of the single active ingredients included in a FDC in the US market at the time
the FDC drug first enters the market, the AWP unit price of the single active ingredients brands
were used in the analysis.
The price analysis was performed based on the price difference percentage between the
FDC drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination. When
several strengths were available for the same active ingredient the price difference percentage
was calculated based on the average percentage for all strengths. All prices were adjusted to
2013 dollars using the all items, not seasonally adjusted, US city average consumer price index.
Descriptive analyses were performed to estimate and compare FDC drug AWP and the
AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination. The price difference percentage
between the FDC drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination
was estimated over the study period, and analyzed by therapeutic class.
Price differences between FDC and single drug groups were assessed using the Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test. Price differences among time periods and drug characteristic groups were
assessed using Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. ANOVA was used to test the differences of the price
difference percentage of the combination drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs
among decades, and drug characteristic groups. A multiple linear regression model was
performed to evaluate the association between the price difference percentage of the combination
drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination, and the study
explanatory variables. Independent variables were the number of active ingredients in the
combination, the number of single active ingredients that had generic competition at the first
FDC market entry, the first AWP effective year for the FDC drug, and the FDC therapeutic class.
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Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, and multiple linear regression analyses
were performed on therapeutic classes that had 5 or more FDC drugs.
Descriptive statistics were also performed using the FUL unit price for single generic
drugs when available. A t-tests analysis was performed to compare the FUL and the AWP of the
price difference percentage of the FDC drugs and the price sum of the single drugs included in
the combination. All analyses were performed using SAS 9.2 statistical software. Significance
level was set at 0.05.
Results
In the period 1980-2012, the FDA approved 901 new drugs, including 811 NMEs and 90
BLAs. New combinations containing at least one NME represented 3.5% of the FDA approved
NMEs (n=28). The FDA did not approve any combination for BLAs. In addition, the FDA
approved 117 new combinations that have at least one single active ingredient previously
approved by the FDA as a NME or BLA. These FDC drugs include 115 NMEs and 2 BLAs.
Overall, 10.4% (n=12) of the 115 FDC drugs including a NME were approved by the FDA using
priority review (i.e., a review process applied by the FDA to drugs considered improvements
over the already marketed therapeutic alternatives). The percentage of priority review approvals
was highest for antinfectives for systemic use FDC (50.0% of total FDA approvals). The number
of FDC drug approvals increased over time from 12 in the 1980s, to 25 in the 1990s, and 58 in
the 2000s. In the period 2010-2012, the FDA approved 22 FDC drugs. The 117 FDC drugs
approved in the period 1980-2012 include a total of 156 different single active ingredients with
an average of 2.1 active ingredients per combination.
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The price analysis excluded 22 FDC not marketed in the US as of December 31, 2013,
and 29 FDC without complete active ingredient, strength, route of administration, approval date,
and price information. The final analytical sample for the price analysis included 66 FDC drugs.
The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC drugs and the
average AWP unit price sum of the single drugs included in the combination is on average
84.9%±26.2% (Table 8). The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC
and the single drugs included in the combination varies by therapeutic class (p = 0.0022). The
FDC average AWP unit price percentage of cardiovascular system drugs was significantly higher
than the average AWP unit price percentage of alimentary tract and metabolism drugs (86.7 ±
23.7 and 67.4 ± 20.5%, respectively; p = 0.012). Likewise, the FDC average AWP unit price
percentage of alimentary tract and metabolism drugs was significantly lower than the average
AWP unit price percentage of anti-infectives for systemic use (67.4 ± 20.5% and 105.8 ± 16.9%,
respectively; p = 0.0008). The difference in the FDC average AWP unit price percentage of
cardiovascular drugs and anti-infectives for systemic use was not statistically significant (Table
8).
FDC AWP unit price significantly increased during the study period from a median of
US$1.40 (IQR US$ 0.71) in the 1980s, to US$ 1.92 (IQR US$0.70) in the 1990s (p = 0.0263),
US$3.38 (IQR US$3.19) in the 2000s (p = 0.0019), and US$5.78 (IQR US$7.64) in the period
2010–2012 (p = 0.0014). Overall, the average AWP unit price difference percentage between the
FDC and single active ingredients included in the combination decreased over time from 119.3 ±
29.2% in the 80 s to 86.7 ±23.2% in the 00 s (p < 0.05; Table 9).
The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC and the single
active ingredients in the combination increases with the number of single active ingredients in
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the combination. The percentage average AWP unit price difference was, on average, 84.7 ±
27.1% when the FDC contains two single active ingredients, up to 86.0 ± 15.0% when the
combination contains three active ingredients, although the difference was not statistically
significant (Table 9).
The average AWP unit price difference percentage also increases with the number of
active ingredients in the combination that have generic competition. The FDC average AWP unit
price was on average 83.3 ± 23.4% of the single drug average AWP unit price sum when there
were no generic versions in the market. This average AWP unit price difference percentage
increases to 95.1 ± 42.3% (p < 0.01) when there were two single active ingredients in the
combination that have generic versions in the market at the time the FDC drugs enters into the
US market (Table 9).
The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC and the single drugs
in the combination was significantly associated with the FDC drug therapeutic class (p < 0.001),
the year when the FDC first enters into the US market (p < 0.001), and the number of single
drugs in the combination that have generic competition at the time of the FDC market entry (p <
0.05; Table 10). The association between the average AWP unit price percentage difference and
the number of active ingredients included in the combination was not statistically significant.
There were 13 generic single drugs that have FUL price data available at the time the
FDC first enters the market. The price difference percentage between the FDC and the single
active ingredient drugs using the average FUL prices, instead of the AWP, was even larger. The
mean price difference percentage between the FDC and the price sum of single drugs in the
combination was 104.2 ± 51.2% compared with 78.7 ± 35.2% for the FUL and AWP (p < 0.01),
respectively. This price difference also varies by therapeutic class. The price difference
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percentage between AWP of cardiovascular FDC and single drugs was 108.2 ±16.9% and 71.4 ±
8.7% for FUL and AWP (p < 0.001), respectively. Likewise, the price difference percentage
between alimentary tract and metabolism FDC and single drugs was 71.7 ± 31.6% and 62.8 ±
27.8% for FUL and AWP (p < 0.05), respectively (Table 11).
Discussion
This study assesses the AWP per unit for all FDC drugs approved by the FDA in the period 19802012 compared to the sum of the AWP per unit of the single active ingredients included in the
combination at the time the FDC drug first enters the US market. FDC drug AWP unit prices are, on
average, lower than the AWP per unit sum of the single drugs in the FDC. However, the price difference
varied significantly by therapeutic class. In addition, this study reveals that the price difference percentage
between FDC and single drugs increases with the number of single drugs that have generic competition.
Study results corroborate previous research regarding pharmaceutical companies FDC drugs marketing
strategy [14, 17, 22]. Pharmaceutical companies market FDC drugs to maintain market share as more

single active ingredient drugs lose patent protection over time and more generic drugs enter the
market increasing competition, and driving prices down.
Novel study findings provide evidence that pharmaceutical companies’ pricing strategy
varies by therapeutic class and FDA review process. The AWP per unit of cardiovascular and
alimentary track and metabolism FDC drugs at first market entry is lower than the AWP sum of
the single active ingredients indicating that companies reduce the FDC AWP unit price in
therapeutic classes with high utilization and large number of drug competitors in the market. In
addition, cardiovascular and alimentary track and metabolism FDC drugs are not granted priority
review status by the FDA at the time of approval, indicating that those FDC drugs do not
represent an improvement over the already marketed single active ingredient drugs. Conversely,

55

the AWP unit price of antinfectives for systemic use is higher for the FDC than the AWP per unit
sum of the single active ingredients in the combination. Antinfective FDC drugs represent the
highest percentage of FDA priority review FDC drug approvals in the study period. Furthermore,
antinfective FDC drug approvals include indications for diseases, such as HIV and hepatitis C,
that typically have fewer formulary restrictions hence, allowing pharmaceutical companies to
setup a premium price for the combination.
Further, study results evidence that pharmaceutical companies’ pricing strategy for
cardiovascular and alimentary track and metabolism FDC drugs is based on setting up FDC
AWP unit price below the price sum of the individual products included in the combination to
signal the market that the combination is cheaper. Pharmaceutical companies setup the FDC drug
price at market entry at the same level of the costliest single active ingredient in the combination
to shift demand from single active ingredients facing generic competition towards new FDC
drugs.
Pharmaceutical companies often advertise FDC drugs as pharmaceutical products that are
convenient to the patient, with lower copayments and pharmacy dispensing fees associated with
dispensing a FDC drug instead of multiple single ingredients [20, 21, 30-33]. Prior research also
explored the clinical evidence on the differences between FDC drugs and single active ingredient
regimens. FDC drugs reduce the complexity of treatment regimens and increase treatment
adherence and persistence [34-39]. However, research is needed to assess whether those
advantages outweigh the potential risk of exposing patients to higher dosage of pharmaceuticals
and to estimate the cost-effectiveness of FDC drugs compared to single active ingredients
included in the combination.
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The AWP is the most commonly used unit price in the US market to estimate the drug
product acquisition cost that is used to setup payments and reimbursement rates. The AWP does
not represent actual transaction market prices; pharmaceutical companies setup a high AWP unit
price to later on provide substantial discounts and rebates to pharmacies, managed care
companies and health care payers. Study analysis using FUL prices, instead of AWP, further
evidence that the AWP overestimate the actual final drug acquisition prices. The price difference
percentage between the FDC and the single active ingredient drugs using the FUL prices further
evidences that the actual market transaction prices for cardiovascular FDC drugs may be in fact
higher than the price sum of the single ingredients when there are generic drugs in the US
market.
Limitations
This study used the AWP unit price to proxy prices of FDC and single ingredient drugs.
The AWP is an essential data resource for payers, decision makers, and stakeholders and it is
commonly used as a drug price benchmark by state Medicaid programs, Pharmacy Benefit
Managers (PBMs), and health plans. The AWP pricing history for almost all FDA approved
drugs allows price comparison analyses and trends evaluation at the drug population level.
However, the AWP does not represent the actual transaction price or reflect any discounts or
rebates [29]. In addition, third-party payers use other methods to manage drug prices such as
Medicaid Federal Upper Limit (FUL) for multiple-resource drugs [40]. Thus, price differences
between FDC and single drugs may be overestimated.
The analysis is conducted based on the AWP at the time the FDC drug enters the US
market. Generic drug market entry may lead to decreases in drug prices over time [41]; hence,
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the price difference percentage between FDC and generic versions of the single active
ingredients in the combination may become larger over time.
Study findings may not be representative of the combination drug market. The study
includes 66 FDC drugs with complete information. Price data availability including rebates and
discounts, and completeness of the information remains a challenge limiting the transparency in
the pharmaceutical market. Last, analysis is based on the AWP unit price since defined daily
dose data are not available for FDC drugs. Further research is needed to assess FDC drug
utilization, actual drug acquisition prices after rebates and discounts, and costs of FDC drugs
compared to the single active ingredients included in the combination.
Conclusions
The AWP price difference percentage between FDC and single active ingredient drugs
included in the combination is correlated with the therapeutic class, the year of first FDA
approval of the combination, and the number of single drugs in the combination that have
generic versions at FDC market entry.

58

References
1. Orloff DG. Fixed combination drugs for cardiovascular disease risk reduction: regulatory
approach. Am J Cardiol. 2005;96(9A):28K-33K.
2. 21-CFR-300.50: Fixed-combination prescription drugs for humans. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA); 1975.
3. Guidelines for registration of fixed-dose combination medicinal products. WHO Technical
Report Series. World Health Organization (WHO). 2005. Available at:
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s19979en/s19979en.pdf [Last accessed April, 20th
2014].
4. Gilks CF, Crowley S, Ekpini R, et al. The WHO public-health approach to antiretroviral
treatment against HIV in resource-limited settings. Lancet. 2006;368(9534):505-10.
5. Graul AI, Sorbera LA, Bozzo J,et al. The year's new drugs and biologics--2006. Drug News
Perspect. 2007;20(1):17-44.
6. Bhat VN. Patent term extension strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceuticals
Policy and Law 2005;6:109-22.
7. The independent review of medical treatment: new drugs from old. Drug Ther Bull.
2006;44(10):73-7.
8. Hong SH, Shepherd MD, Scoones D, Wan TT. Product-line extensions and pricing strategies
of brand-name drugs facing patent expiration. J Manag Care Pharm. 2005;11(9):746-54.
9. Wadman M. The right combination. Nature. 2006;439(26):390-1.
10. Prescription drug costs. Kaiser Family Foundation. 2010. Available at:
http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/Prescription-Drug-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx. [Last
accessed July 20th 2013].

59

11. Friedman HS, Eid NS, Crespi S, et al. Retrospective claims study of fluticasone
propionate/salmeterol fixed-dose combination use as initial asthma controller therapy in children
despite guideline recommendations. Clin Ther. 2009;31(5):1056-63.
12. Brixner DI, Lenhart G, Young DC, Samuelson WM. The effect of fixed combination of
fluticasone and salmeterol on asthma drug utilization, asthma drug cost, and episodes of asthma
exacerbations. Curr Med Res Opin. 2007;23(11):2887-95.
13. Bangalore S, Kamalakkannan G, Parkar S, Messerli FH. Fixed-dose combinations improve
medication compliance: a meta-analysis. Am J Med. 2007;120(8):713-9.
14. Hong SH, Wang J, Tang J. Dynamic view on affordability of fixed-dose combination
antihypertensive drug therapy. Am J Hypertens. 2013;26(7):879-87.
15. Chobanian AV, Bakris GL, Black HR, et al. The Seventh Report of the Joint National
Committee on Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure: the
JNC 7 report. JAMA. 2003;289(19):2560-72.
16. Gish RG, Gholam PM. Monotherapy vs multiple-drug therapy: the experts debate. Cleve
Clin J Med. 2009;76 Suppl 3:S20-4.
17. Rabbani A, Alexander GC. Out-of-pocket and total costs of fixed-dose combination
antihypertensives and their components. Am J Hypertens. 2008;21(5):509-13.
18. Taylor AA, Shoheiber O. Adherence to antihypertensive therapy with fixed-dose amlodipine
besylate/benazepril HCl versus comparable component-based therapy. Congest Heart Fail.
2003;9(6):324-32.
19. Dickson M, Plauschinat CA. Compliance with antihypertensive therapy in the elderly: a
comparison of fixed-dose combination amlodipine/benazepril versus component-based freecombination therapy. Am J Cardiovasc Drugs. 2008;8(1):45-50.

60

20. Brixner DI, Jackson KC, 2nd, Sheng X, et al. Assessment of adherence, persistence, and
costs among valsartan and hydrochlorothiazide retrospective cohorts in free-and fixed-dose
combinations. Curr Med Res Opin. 2008;24(9):2597-607.
21. Balu S, Simko RJ, Quimbo RM, Cziraky MJ. Impact of fixed-dose and multi-pill
combination dyslipidemia therapies on medication adherence and the economic burden of suboptimal adherence. Curr Med Res Opin. 2009;25(11):2765-75.
22. Malesker MA, Hilleman DE. Comparison of amlodipine/valsartan fixed-dose combination
therapy and conventional therapy. Manag Care. 2010;19(7):36-42.
23. Ferrario CM, Panjabi S, Buzinec P, Swindle JP. Clinical and economic outcomes associated
with amlodipine/renin-angiotensin system blocker combinations. Ther Adv Cardiovasc Dis.
2013;7(1):27-39.
24. Friedman HS, Yawn BP. Resource utilization in asthma: combined fluticasone
propionate/salmeterol compared with inhaled corticosteroids. Curr Med Res Opin.
2007;23(2):427-34.
25. Rascati KL, Akazawa M, Johnsrud M, Stanford RH, Blanchette CM. Comparison of
hospitalizations, emergency department visits, and costs in a historical cohort of Texas Medicaid
patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, by initial medication regimen. Clin Ther.
2007;29(6):1203-13.
26. Blanchette CM, Akazawa M, Dalal A, Simoni-Wastila L. Risk of hospitalizations/emergency
department visits and treatment costs associated with initial maintenance therapy using
fluticasone propionate 500 microg/salmeterol 50 microg compared with ipratropium for chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease in older adults. Am J Geriatr Pharmacother. 2008;6(3):138-46.

61

27. Dalal AA, Roberts MH, Petersen HV, Blanchette CM, Mapel DW. Comparative costeffectiveness of a fluticasone-propionate/salmeterol combination versus anticholinergics as
initial maintenance therapy for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Int J Chron Obstruct
Pulmon Dis. 2011;6:13-22.
28. RED BOOK A Comprehensive, Consistent Drug Pricing Resource. Thomson Micomedex’s
Red Book 2014. Available at: http://micromedex.com/redbook [Last accessed April, 20th 2014].
29. Prescription Drug Pricing in the Private Sector. Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2007.
Available at: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7715/01-03prescriptiondrug.pdf [Last accessed April, 20th 2014].
30. Cheong C, Barner JC, Lawson KA, Johnsrud MT. Patient adherence and reimbursement
amount for antidiabetic fixed-dose combination products compared with dual therapy among
Texas Medicaid recipients. Clin Ther. 2008;30(10):1893-907.
31. Barner JC. Adherence to oral antidiabetic agents with pioglitazone and metformin:
comparison of fixed-dose combination therapy with monotherapy and loose-dose combination
therapy. Clin Ther. 2011;33(9):1281-8.
32. Kruk ME, Schwalbe N. The relation between intermittent dosing and adherence: preliminary
insights. Clin Ther. 2006;28(12):1989-95.
33. Ramjan R, Calmy A, Vitoria M, Mills EJ, Hill A, Cooke G, Ford N. Systematic review and
meta-analysis: Patient and program impact of fixed-dose combination antiretroviral therapy.
Trop Med Int Health. 2014;19(5):501-13.
34. Hong SH, Wang J, Tang J. Dynamic view on affordability of fixed-dose combination
antihypertensive drug therapy. Am J Hypertens. 2013;26(7):879-87.

62

35. Dickson M, Plauschinat CA. Compliance with antihypertensive therapy in the elderly: a
comparison of fixed-dose combination amlodipine/benazepril versus component-based freecombination therapy. Am J Cardiovasc Drugs. 2008;8(1):45-50.
36. Claxton AJ, Cramer J, Pierce C. A systematic review of the associations between dose
regimens and medication compliance. Clin Ther. 2001;23(8):1296–1310.
37. Bangalore S, Kamalakkannan G, Parkar S, Messerli FH. Fixed-dose combinations improve
medication compliance: a meta-analysis. Am J Med. 2007;120(8):713–719.
38. Saini SD, Schoenfeld P, Kaulback K, Dubinsky MC. Effect of medication dosing frequency
on adherence in chronic diseases. Am J Manag Care. 2009 Jun 1;15(6):e22-33.
39. Gupta AK, Arshad S, Poulter NR. Compliance, safety, and effectiveness of fixed-dose
combinations of antihypertensive agents: a meta-analysis. Hypertension. 2010 Feb;55(2):399407.
40. Federal Upper Limits. Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2014.
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Prescription-Drugs/Federal-Upper-Limits.html. Accessed April 20th 2014.
41. Liberman JN, Roebuck MC. Prescription drug costs and the generic dispensing ratio. Journal
of managed care pharmacy : JMCP. 2010;16(7):502-6.

63

Table 8. FDC and single active ingredient drugs AWP unit price by therapeutic class
Therapeutic Class
N
Percentage of FDC AWP over sum
AWPs of single ingredients (%)
Mean (Std)

Median (IQR)

Cardiovascular System

34

86.7%(23.7%)*

85.6 % (28.9%)

Alimentary Tract and
Metabolism
Antinfectives for Systemic Use

14

67.4%(20.5%)* Ɨ Ɨ

70.1 % (28.2%)

6

105.8%(16.9%) Ɨ Ɨ

100.0 % (2.1%)

Sensory Organs

3

98.4%(38.2%)

97.9 % (76.4%)

Dermatologicals

2

133.3%(33.8%)

133.3 % (47.9%)

Musculo-Skeletal System

2

87.7%(21.0%)

87.7 % (29.8%)

Nervous System

2

74.6%(3.8%)

74.6 % (5.4%)

Respiratory System

2

68.8%(15.4%)

68.8 % (21.8%)

Genito Urinary System and Sex
Hormones
Total

1

49.1%

49.1%

66

84.9%(26.2%)

84.6 % (31.7%)

Note: Analysis includes therapeutic classes that have 5 or more FDC drugs.
* Denotes statistically significant difference of AWP unit price difference percentage between
the FDC and the single drugs between cardiovascular system and alimentary tract and
metabolism (p=0.0127);
ƗƗ
Denotes statistically significant difference of AWP unit price difference percentage between
the FDC and the single drugs between alimentary tract and metabolism and antiinfectives for
systemic use (p=0.0008); IQR=interquartile range.
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Table 9. FDC and single active ingredient drugs AWP by selected characteristics of the
combination
Percentage of FDC AWP over sum
AWPs of single ingredients (%)
Characteristics N
Mean (Std)
Median (IQR)
FDC AWP at first market entry
110.9%(9.4%)
1980s
5
119.3%(29.2%)*
91.4%(23.8%)
1990s
14
84.9%(14.9%)
84.0%(30.0%)
2000s
28
86.7%(23.2%)
65.8%(30.4%)
2010-2012
19
73.0%(28.8%)
Active ingredients included in combination
84.7%(32.5%)
2
60
84.7%(27.1%)
77.7%(31.8%)
3
6
86.0%(15.0%)
Active ingredients that have generic competition
84.8%(36.4%)
0
19
83.3%(23.4%)
85.4%(28.1%)
1
40
83.8%(24.3%)
72.9%(48.1%)
2
7
95.1%(42.3%)**
Notes:* Denotes statistically significant difference between the percentage of FDC AWP over
the sum AWP of single ingredients and decade of FDC AWP at first market entry -1980s
reference. Indicates statistically significant at p<0.05
** Denotes statistically significant difference between the mean of the percentage of FDC
AWP over the sum of single active ingredients in combinations that have generic version for 2
of the single active ingredients in the combination at the time the FDC drugs entered into the
US market compared to combinations that did not have any generic in the combination.
Indicates statistically significant p<0.01
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Table 10. Correlations between the percentage of FDC AWP over sum AWPs of single
active ingredients and FDC drug characteristics
Characteristics
Estimate
Standard
p value
Error
Therapeutic class
Anti-infectives for Systemic Use
Alimentary Tract and Metabolism
Cardiovascular System
FDC AWP effective year at first US market
entry
Active ingredients included in combination

-11.5%

6.5%

0.0002
0.0833

46.7%

10.8%

<0.0001

0.4%

0.0002

ref
-1.5%

0.144

2

ref

3

-16.8%

11.3%

Active ingredients that have generic competition

0.144
0.0193

0

ref

1

13.5%

7.0%

0.0601

2
32.0%
11.1%
0.006
Note: The regression model includes therapeutic classes that have 5 or more FDC drugs.
Number of observations is 54; R2=0.53; ref=reference group
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Table 11. Percentage of FDC AWP over single active ingredient prices: AWP and FUL
Therapeutic
Class

N

Cardiovascular
System
Alimentary Tract
and Metabolism
Dermatologicals

5

Percentage of FDC over sum prices of single active ingredients
Single active ingredient AWP
Single active ingredient FUL
Mean (Std)
Median (IQR)
Mean(Std)
Median (IQR)
71.4%(8.7%) 69.1% (40.1%) 108.2%(16.9%)*** 81.8% (45.5%)

5

62.8%(27.8%)

68.8% (83.2%)

71.7%(31.6%)*

103.0% (16.6%)

1

157.3%

157.3%

157.8%

157.8%

Respiratory
System
Sensory Organs
Total

1

57.9%

57.9%

64.9%

64.9%

1
13

136.8%
78.7%(35.2%)

136.8%
69.3% (24.5%)

232.7%
104.2%(51.2%)**

232.7%
96.8% (31.1%)

Note: Statistically significant difference between the percentage of FDC over sum of single drug
prices based on the AWP and FUL, respectively. *, ** and *** indicates statistically significant
at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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CONCLUSION
The findings of the studies support previous evidence that effective patent life of
pharmaceutical products has increased since the 1980s. The increase in effective patent life
length, however, was not significantly associated with an increased number of FDA-approved
NMEs. Meanwhile, the approval of FDC drugs, especially FDC drugs including at least one
previously marketed single ingredient drug, increased over the last three decades. Though
varying depending on the therapeutic class, on whether the sponsor of the FDC and the single
drug included in the combination was the same or different, and on the generic market entry of
single drugs included in the combination, pharmaceutical companies marketed FDC drugs
shortly before the generic alternative of the single active ingredient included in the combination
reached the market, and effectively extended the patent and marketing exclusivity protection of
the single drugs included in the combination.
These results indicate that, given the importance of patent protection to pharmaceutical
products, longer patent time alone did not contribute significantly to bringing more innovative
new drugs to the market. Alternative incentives and regulations should be considered by policyand decision-makers for the purpose of encouraging more innovative new drugs. Further, based
on the entire body of FDA-approved FDC drugs from 1980 to 2012, the study provides empirical
evidence on the economics behind the development and approval of FDC drugs and the
statement that FDC drugs of products that are already marketed has been a common strategy for
brand-name drug companies to extend the patent and exclusivity life of single ingredient drugs
with an expiring patent.
In regard to the economics of the FDC drug pricing, the study found that the FDC
average wholesale price unit price increased significantly over time and that pharmaceutical
68

companies set FDC AWP, at the same level of the costliest single active ingredient in the
combination as pricing strategy to shift demand from single active ingredients facing generic
competition toward new FDC drugs. However, the price difference between FDC and single
ingredient drugs varied by therapeutic class, the year the FDC entered into the US market and the
number of single drugs in the combination that have generic drugs at FDC market entry.
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